SECTION 304-A OF I.P.C. - A LICENSE TO KILL?

by:
Bharat Maheshwari
IVth yr. B.A. LL.B. (5 yrs)
BVU New Law College.

The original Indian Penal Code, 1860 had no provision providing punishment for causing death by negligence. Section 304-A was inserted in the Code in 1870 by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1870.[1] This section did not create a new offence but was directed towards the offences which fall outside the range of section 299 and 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (herein after referred as I.P.C.) when neither intention nor knowledge to cause death is present.

The said section reads as follows:

304A. Causing death by negligence.--Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
The provisions of this section apply to cases where there is no intention to cause death, and no knowledge that the act done in all probability would cause death.[2] The Supreme Court has clarified that the section 304-A of I.P.C. is applicable only when death is caused due to rash and negligent act of the accused, which is an essential element to attract said provision.[3] But a colossal group of legal scholars have always questioned whether this section provides punishment for manslaughter without intention or is it a ‘license to kill’ in disguise of a rash and negligent act.

It is very much convincing that this section would have no applicability where the act is in its nature criminal. Only the act done negligently or rashly invokes the validity of this section and it cannot be applicable to result, which supervenes upon the act which could not have been anticipated. While discussing the scope of this section as a license to kill, one may conceive that the term ‘rash’ classifies the various events and acts in road accidents, mishandling of hazardous materials or lethal weapons etc. while the term ‘negligent’ can be associated with the acts of professionals like medical practitioners or pharmacists etc. But the different levels of judiciary have from time to time defined and premeditated the applicability of this section ensuring it doesn’t create a defensive ground for people to commit homicide.

This section deals with homicide by negligence and covers that class of offences, where death is caused neither intentionally nor with the knowledge that the act of the offender is likely to cause death, but because of the rash and negligent act of the offender. This clause limits itself to rash and negligent acts which cause death, but falls short of culpable homicide of either description.[4] When any of the two elements, namely, intention or knowledge, is present this section has no application.[5] Intentional shooting at a fleeing person and hitting someone else to death comes under the section 300 read with section 301 of the I.P.C. It is not a negligent act so as to come under section 304-A.[6] This section applies to rash and negligence acts and does not apply to cases where death has been voluntarily caused.[7] This makes it clear that there can be no circumstances when one’s act can be read into this particular section in order to avail him the benefit of not being charged under section 299 to 302 of the I.P.C.

Thus it’s clear that the facts which must be proven in order to invoke the applicability of this section are essentially three folds:[8]

(1) Death of a human being;

(2) The accused caused the death;

(3) The death was caused by the doing of a rash and negligent act, though it did not amount to culpable homicide.

The ‘rash or negligent act’ referred to in this section means the act which is the immediate cause of death, and not any act or omission, which can utmost be said to be a remote cause of death.[9] If an act is intended to hurt and injure a specific person or object, the perpetrator of the act must be imputed with an intentional act done with consideration and cannot amount to a ‘rash’ and ‘negligent’ act.[10] It is imperative to note that there is difference between rashness and negligence. A rash act is primarily an overhasty act.[11] Negligence is a breach of duty caused by omission to do something, which a reasonable guided, by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do.[12]

At this point it is necessary to have a close perusal of the words of this section which it reads as “rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide”. The very words of this section indicate that the intent of the legislature was to apply this provision to the acts where a homicide was not culpable, i.e. where there was no intention to kill. The requirement of section 304-A of I.P.C. is that; death of any person must have been caused by the accused doing any rash or negligent act. In other words, there must be proof that the rash and negligent act of the accused was the proximate cause of death.[13] There must be a direct nexus between the death of a person and the rash or negligent act of the accused, a remote nexus is not enough.[14] To impose criminal liability u/s 304-A of IPC it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of the rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must be proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s negligence, and it must be a causa causans, and not causa sine quo non.[15]

To see the other side of the same coin in Satnam Singh v. State of Rajasthan[16] it could not be proved that the truck driver deliberately crushed the man on the scooter, thus the conviction was made under section 304-A of I.P.C. Again in Murari v. State of M.P.[17] it was critically observed that truck driver knew that the passengers were sitting on the slabs he was carrying. But still he drove negligently and despite the protest by passengers caused an accident, leading to the death of a woman and two children. While in Kanaiyalal Arjandas v. Tribhuvandas[18] the prosecution was unable to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle. Another connotation regarding the applicability of this section is that if the driver of a motor vehicle does not blow the horn because of the prevailing traffic rules prohibit him in doing so, it can neither be said that he failed to exercise reasonable and proper care nor that the duty to blow horn was imperative upon him, so as to hold him guilty of negligence under this section.[19] Further the Supreme Court has laid down that, to render a person liable for neglect of duty there must be such a degree of culpability as to amount to gross negligence on his part. It is not every little slip or mistake that will make a man so liable.[20] So it can be observed that at times this section creates such conditions, whereby one can use it as a defensive and protective measure in order to escape from the clutches of culpable homicide amounting to murder.

The very best and clear example of this section can be drawn from State of Karnataka v. Mohd. Ismail[21], where a 28 year old motor-cyclist pushed from behind an old man of 85 years who sustained head injuries and died on the spot, the death was held to be result of rash and negligent conduct. In another classic example the petitioner was convicted under the same section, where the petitioner constructed a water tank for the use of village people. The tank when filled with water collapsed killing seven villagers. The tank collapsed because the material used in the construction was of low quality.[22]

The question here is that can someone kill a person in the disguise of a rash or negligence act. The very best example which strikes everyone’s mind is that of automobile accidents. In this regard the investigation and the role of witnesses are of great importance. Coming to the question of whether there was any rash and negligence involved, the evidence of the RTO is relevant. In Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka[23] it was clearly stated that the accident did not occur on account of mechanical defects. The evidence of eye witnesses showed that the vehicle was being driven at a very high speed and that the road was quite wide and there was no traffic at the time of accident. The evidence of witnesses showed that the vehicle dashed against the tree and the branches of the tree fell on it. As per evidence though it was rainy season but there was no rain at the relevant point of time, thus the accused was held guilty under this section. The principle of ‘res ispa loquitur’ is the only rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The said principle has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the absence of negligence the accident would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and the control of the alleged wrong-doer.[24] In an another event the petitioner was himself driving the bus over the bridge when it fell into a canal thus it was concluded that in such a situation the doctrine of ‘res ispa loquitur’ comes to play and the burden of proof shifts to the person in control of the motor vehicle to show that the accident did not happened on account of his negligence. He was unable to show that there was any other reason of the accident rather than his negligence.[25]

While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the most important consideration should be deterrence.[26] A professional driver pedals the accelerator of an automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is one the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if an accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even such death ensures that he might not be convicted of the offence and lastly that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of human beings due to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the court can play, particularly at the level of trail courts for lessening the high rate of motor-accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.[27]

Though it might be a difficult issue to determine that whether there was negligence on the part of the accused or the act was done intentionally and the degree of punishment the convict deserves. But very instance of driving without due care and attention is a crime and it can scarcely be a law that every such case would be manslaughter if the driving happened to cause death.[28] But if a driver is not rash, he is not liable for the death of a person who suddenly comes before his vehicle. For instance in M. H. Lokre v. State of Maharastra[29], the appellant who was not driving rashly was not held guilty under this section for causing the death of the person who, while suddenly crossing the road, came under the wheels of his vehicle. However vigilant and slowly a man might be driving, he cannot avert an accident if a person suddenly crosses the road.[30]

While discussing the scope of a particular legislative text, one has to study the intent of the legislature behind the articulation of that section or article. The intent of the nineteenth century drafters of the section 304-A was not to create a license to kill but in the present scenario due to lack of evidence and at times due to some magical advocacy one can avail illegitimate benefits of this section. But such a situation is very much nominal and is rarely found. It has been said that in cases falling under this section it is dangerous to attempt to distinguish between the approximate and ultimate cause of death. But there is a negligible chance that the judiciary will get confused between section 304-A and the sections 299 to 302 of the I.P.C. Thus it must be concluded that the said section doesn’t endow a “License to kill” but is to protect the persons who had no intention to kill and due to an act of negligence did become guilty of a homicide.

[1] Dr. K. I. Vibhute, PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law, 10th Edition, LexisNexis Butterworths India, New Delhi, 2008, p. 818
[2] Prof. S. N. Mishra, Indian Penal Code, 13th Edition, Central Law Publications, Allahabad, 2005, p. 505
[3] Girish Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, AIR 2008 SC 3136
[4] Raghunath Bahesa v. State of Orissa, (1968) Cr LJ 851 (Ori)
[5] Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of Maharastra, AIR 2004 SC 1966
[6] Abdul Ise Suleman v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 464 (SC)
[7] Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala, AIR 2007 SC 2376, para 5
[8] 2, Justice V. V. Raghavan, revised by P. M. Bakshi, Law of Crimes, 5th Edition, India Law House, New Delhi, 1999, p. 188
[9] Akbar Ali, (1936) 12 Luck 336; Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s, The Indian Penal Code, 30th Edition, Re-print 2009, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, p. 548
[10] Karuni Samal and Others v. State, 1976 Cut LT 207; R. N. Saxena, Indian Penal Code, Sixteenth Edition, 2005, Central Law Publications, Allahabad, p. 314
[11] Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (Cri) 844
[12] 3, Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, 11th Edition, Law Publishers, Allahabad, 1998, p. 3028
[13] 4, A. N. Sana, Supreme Court on Criminal Law (1950-2008), 2nd Edition, Ashok Law House, New Delhi, 2009, p. 4169
[14] Mulani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1968 SC 829
[15] Kurban Hussein Mohamadali v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1965 SC 1616
[16] Satnam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2000 SC 423
[17] Murari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2001 Cr LJ 2968 (MP)
[18] Kanaiyalal Arjandas v. Tribhuvandas, 1998 Cr LJ 3842 (Guj)
[19] Tukaram Sitaram, (1970) 72 Bom LR 492
[20] State of Karnataka v. Krishna (1987) 1 SCC 538
[21] State of Karnataka v. Mohd. Ismail, 1989 Cr LJ 235 (Kant)
[22] Bhimabhai Kalabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1992 Cr LJ 2585 (Guj)
[23] Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka, 2007 Cr LJ 1451 (SC)
[24] Mohammed Aynuddin v. State of Andra Pradesh, AIR 2000 SC 2511
[25] Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, 2003 (9) SCC 208 (SC)
[26] Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s, The Indian Penal Code, 30th Edition, Re-print 2009, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, p. 547
[27] Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 1677
[28] David Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, Cases & Materials, Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 646
[29] M. H. Lokre v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1972 SC 221
[30] K. D. Gaur, A Textbook on the Indian Penal Code, Third Edition, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2004, p. 439

AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS:- THE GREAT INDIAN APPERICIATED DISCRIMINATION

BY: - -Prof. Aman Mishra

A lot of problems created, heated talks and the controversies provoked, a sigh of relief had been provided to many, and a number of answers have been furnished by the present and recent ruling of the apex Court. Once again the same old wine in the new bottle has been served by the Supreme Court through its recent verdict which Okays 27% quota for the OBCs. The five member Supreme Court bench upheld the OBC quota in central educational institutions clearing the way for the reservations of seats for the ‘backward’ castes over a period of three years from the academic year 2008-2009 . The cream-hunters received a vital blow through the judgment when the Court said emphatic ‘no’ to the creamy layer for the purpose of the inclusion .

Already much ink has been splashed on the issue of affirmative action both in India and USA. Therefore not much is desired to waste now. The enormous literature is available on affirmative action in debris. Yet the issue remains unresolved and every now and then opportunists are ready to stoop to dig these matters in order to grab or retain the power. No issue has stirred up so much controversy as the present issue on Affirmative Action programs and their continuous existence which was meant to address the past discrimination for limited time only both in India and USA. The politics today has become the heaven of corrupt and they always promise the impossible on the eve of every election which has been described by some scholars as ‘election gimmick’. In this context, a comprehensive and comparative study of the topic is expeditious as well as desirous in order to examine the current state of affairs in affirmative actions and at the same time to search for the solution to solve the present problem, which was probably done by Galanter Marc for what he termed “Compensatory Discrimination”.

The terms like ‘castes’ in India and ‘race’ in USA are believed to be predominant factors used for affirmative actions though there exists other parameters like religion etc. Caste differences were supposed to be based, not on physical differences, but on assumed spiritual differences. Two individuals might be physically similar, yet one be a Brahmin and a Dalit. The race is also one of the major factors of discrimination prevalent in both the country . Further there are never-ending disputes about the statistical and other data used by the Government of India as well as of states. Furthermore Neither the central nor the states governments has made any real efforts at evaluating or appraising as to how far affirmative action has made a dent in the life of so called ‘disadvantaged groups’.

Soon after the intention of founding philosophers of the Indian Constitution had been expressed, the affirmative action programs in the form of reservations have been put to test and since then, every now and then the problems relating to affirmative action programs are prevalent in one form or the other. Every aspect of these programs has its own problems and requires some sort of analysis in order to understand those problems. It appears from more closure look at the paradigm that at earlier the Judiciary has been reluctant in implementing these programs in India as evident from the case of State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan. In this case, the Court has pronounced that caste based reservations as per Communal Award violates Article 15(1). In order to resolve this dilemma the 1st Constitutional amendment was introduced. Then came the famous case in 1963 of M.R. Balaji v. Mysore in which the Court has put 50% cap on reservations. Almost all the states followed this judgment except Tamil Nadu and further the same law has been put under the ninth schedule of the Indian Constitution.

Another move in this direction was the case of Indra Sawhney and Others v. Union of India (Popularly known as ‘Mandal Case’) in which a number of doubts have been cleared and at the same time created. The court upheld implementation of separate reservation for other backward classes in central government jobs. It also ordered to exclude Creamy layer of other backward classes from enjoying reservation facilities and declared separate reservations for poor among forward castes as invalid. It also held that reservations can not be applied in promotions. To escape from this pronouncement again 77th Constitutional amendment came into existence by virtue of which Art. 16(4)-A and 16 (4) - B have been inserted.

Further in Nagraj and Others V Union of India, the court upheld these constitutional amendments. In 1994, the Supreme Court advised Tamilnadu to follow 50% limit by reason of which the whole issue regarding Tamilnadu Reservations had been put under 9th schedule of the constitution from which at that time Supreme Court’s jurisdiction had been ousted albeit at present, this is not the case. Finally in P.A. Inamdar and others V State of Maharashtra Supreme Court ruled that reservations can not be imposed on unaided private educational institutions. To get over the difficulty created by the court, 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act was introduced which inserted a brand new clause Art. 15 (5).

In the year 2006, anti-reservation protests intensified in all parts of India. Dr.Sam Pitroda, Chairperson of the National Knowledge Commission opposed the scheme to extend caste based reservations to OBCs in institutes of higher education.

The reservation in the private sector especially demands a special look and attention particularly after the recent ruling of the Supreme Court and the need emphasized by the Common Minimum Programme of the UPA Government in this respect. The various interpretations given under the Constitution are also need to be examined in order to explore the possibilities of inclusion of members within the socially and educationally backward classes. There are also talks of reservations on the basis of religion which needs to be taken into account.
The American Experience:-
The American Judiciary has been also confronted with the same experiences of the Indian Judiciary . The important difference between the USA and India is that affirmative action in the former is not enshrined in the constitution, nor is it quota-based. The ‘sentiments of equality’ were contained in the Declaration of Independence but not in the original text of the Constitution.

But it is said that the real stirrings of equality came from the Civil Rights Act 1864 especially through its Title VI and VII. Obviously the various amendments also had an important role to play. The 13th , 14th and the 15th became milestone in the American history. But the efforts of Corrective Justice were on its wheel when again there was an interruption, this time by the clouds of ‘Black Codes’ and ‘ Jim Crow Laws’. Then came the case of Plessey Vs Fergussen in which the Court laid dawn the doctrine of ‘Separate but equal’ and which took later on almost 60 years to change the judicial chemistry regarding affirmative action programs in the Brown’s case. Under Johnson and Nixon administrations measures were taken to further strengthen the affirmative action policies.

Conclusion:-
Even in the American context, from Plessy v Fergussen and Equal protection clause to Grutter V Bollinger and Parents v Seattle Community , no clear guideline are available. There is evidence that the term “Politics” is very much prevalent and at the same time dominant in both the countries. Both the Indian and American experience shares many of the things in common and the same comparison may produce some precious fruits. An attempt through the present article is made by in order to scrutinize the affirmative action programs in both the countries meticulously and briefly. The author wishes good efforts from the governments in order to overcome these vital issues and also to see if the success line of American style could be extended in the Indian Panorama

TRACKING THE CASE

SILENT MURDER
…RUCHIKA GIRHOTRA’S CASE

The Case involves the molestation of 14 year old Ruchika Girhotra in 1990 by the Director General of Police Shambhu Pratap Singh Rathore in Haryana, India. After she made a complaint, the victim, her family, and her friends were systematically harassed by the police leading to her eventual suicide. On December 22, 2009, after 19 years, 40 adjournments, and more than 400 hearings, the court finally pronounced Rathore guilty under Section 354 IPC(molestation) but only sentenced him to six months imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1,000.
Ruchika was a student in Class X A (Batch of 1991) at Sacred Heart School for Girls in Chandigarh. Her father, Mr. S.C. Girhotra, was a bank manager. Her mother died when she was ten. Ruchika, along with her friend, Aradhna, took training at the Haryana Lawn Tennis Association (HLTA). The hearings were attended by Aradhna’s parents Anand and Madhu Parkash, after Ruchika's father and brother had to leave Panchkula due to harrasment. Advocates Pankaj Bhardwaj and Meet Malhotra fought the case for free since 1996.
Rathore was on deputation to Bhakhra Beas Management Board as Director, Vigilance and Security, during the time of incident. He was the founding president of the Haryana Lawn Tennis Association and he used the garage of his house at 496 Sector 6, Panchkula, as it's office. Rathore's wife Abha is an advocate. She defended his case from the beginning. Rathore's daughter Priyanjali was Ruchika's classmate. She is now a practising lawyer. His son Rahul also practises law.

http://wikipedia.org/Ruchika_Girhotra_Case.htm
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20091226/main2.htm



On August 11, 1990, Rathore visited Ruchika's house and met her father SC Girhotra. He promised to get special training for Ruchika and requested that Ruchika meet him the following day with regard to this. On August 12 (Sunday), Ruchika, along with her friend Aradhana, went to play at the lawn tennis court and met Rathore in his office (in the garage of his house). On seeing both of them, Rathore asked Aradhana to call the tennis coach (Mr. Thomas) to his room. Aradhana left, and Rathore was alone with Ruchika. He immediately grabbed her hand and waist and pressed his body against hers. Ruchika tried to push him away, but he continued molesting her. But Aradhana returned and witnessed what was going on. On seeing her, Rathore released Ruchika. But Aradhana returned and witnessed what was going on. On seeing her, Rathore released Ruchika. But it was on August 14, when Rathore called the girls to their office, they told their parents about the incident.
After this, a few Panchkula residents decided to meet higher authorities in this regard. They met Home Secretary J K Duggal, who, on August 17, 1990, discussed the matter with the Home Minister and asked DGP Ram Rakshpal Singh to investigate. On September 3, 1990, the inquiry report submitted by RR Singh to Home Secretary J K Duggal indicted Rathore which recommended that an FIR be filed immediately against Rathore. But no action was taken.
On September 20, 1990, two weeks after the inquiry indicted Rathore, Ruchika was expelled from her school, with reason being non-payment of fees and also indiscipline. And then, the story of harassment started. Ruchika was followed and abused by Rathore’s henchmen. False cases of theft, murder and civil defamation were filed against Ruchika's father and her 10 year old brother Ashu and also, there were cases against Anand Parkash, his wife Madhu, and their minor daughter Aradhana. Aradhana, who is the sole witness in the molestation case, had ten civil cases filed against her by Rathore. She received abusive and threatening calls for months until she got married and left for Australia.
On September 23 1993, Ruchika's then 13 year old brother, Ashu, was picked up in the market place near his house by police to Crime Investigation Agency (CIA) Staff Office in Mansa Devi, Panchkula. He was tortured there. Later, he was taken to his house and beaten mercilessly in front of Ruchika by Rathore. Rathore then threatened her, saying that if she did not take back the complaint, her father, and then she herself, would face the same fate. Ashu was picked up again on November 11, 1993. He was tortured again and was unable to walk due to the beatings. Ruchika’s house in Sector 6 Panchkula was forcibly sold to a lawyer working for Rathore. Ruchika's father was suspended from his job as bank manager, on charges of alleged corruption, after coercion from Rathore.
http://wikipedia.org/Ruchika_Girhotra_Case.htm
http://PunjabNewsline.com/RuchikaMolestationCase/FreshFIRagainstRathoreandotherpoliceofficials.htm

On December 28, 1993, Ruchika consumed poison. She died the next day, on December 29, 1993. Rathore refused to release Ruchika's body to her father Subhash unless he signed blank sheets of paper. Rathore also threatened to kill Ashu, who was still in illegal police custody. He was brought back to his house, unconscious, after Ruchika's last rites were over. The autopsy report was tampered and forged. The government closed the case filed against Rathore less than a week after her death. Unable to bear the harassment, her family moved out of Chandigarh.
In November 1994, Rathore was promoted. No action was taken on the inquiry report. Anand Parkash started trying to get copy of the report. After 3 years, he finally obtained it in 1997, and in November, moved the Punjab and Haryana High Court. On August 21, 1998, the High Court directed the CBI to conduct an inquiry. On November 16, 2000, the CBI filed a charge sheet against Rathore u/s 354 (molestation) of IPC. Despite the CBI charge sheet, the government allowed Rathore to continue as police chief.
The first hearing for the case was on November 17, 2000 and the hearings continued till May 2006. After filing the charge sheet in 2000, the CBI took 7 years to record evidence from 16 prosecution witnesses. On the other hand, the defense counsel took nine months to complete examination of 13 out of the total 17 witnesses. Rathore tried to use his influence with the CBI. Rathore also used other technical grounds like demanding that the trial be videographed to cause more delays. He later claimed that the long delays were grounds for a reduced sentence.
On November 5, 2009, the case was transferred from the Ambala court to CBI Chandigarh. In December, the court closed all final arguments, gave its verdict and on December 21, 2009, special judge J.S. Sidhu, pronounced a six-month jail sentence and a fine of Rs 1000 to Rathore. Though, the sentence has been suspended upto January 20, 2010. Rathore was also granted bail in just 15 minutes of passing the sentence.
The Haryana police registered two fresh FIRs against former state Director General of Police S.P.S Rathore and other police officials for allegedly lodging false cases against Ruchika Girhotra's brother, trying to murder him and fabricating her postmortem report, under sections 307 (attempt to murder), 182 (false information, with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person), 195A (threatening a person to give false evidence) of the IPC. Police booked four persons, including former state Director General of Police Shambhu Partap Singh Rathore for attempt to murder, illegal detention and forging the documents in connection with the Ruchika murder and suicide case. Sub-inspector Prem Dutt and assistant sub-inspectors Jai Narayan and Sewa Singh are the others accused against whom the cases have been registered.

Within 24 hours of getting booked, Rathore applied for anticipatory bail on Wednesday but was not given relief. The sessions court in Panchkula denied him interim bail and listed his case for hearing on January 1. Thus, it seems that Rathore would finally be getting the taste for his deeds.

This incidence has shaken entire nation. It is a matter of shame that so much atrocity has been committed. Ruchika was an innocent girl, who became prey to powerful and worthless authorities. Her whole family was played with, in the same matter and she finally committed suicide after 3 years. Her friend Anuradha, fought for justice with her parents, all of which gave no result in the end. It is a shame that the Girhotra family had to endure all this for 19 long years. In Ruchika’s Case and many more like her, we have failed miserably on all fronts, Police, judicial, administrative, political, moral, and social. In India, people belonging to higher class, mostly try to mislead the procedure of Law, so the need of the hour is to ban the interference of politics in the matters of police and judiciary.

LEGAL MAXIMS

Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex - Reason is the soul of the law; when the reason of the law changes the law also is changed.
Facta sunt potentiora verbis - Facts are more powerful than words.